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Abstract 
Many tools and safe computing practices are available to information system users to 
help them avoid the negative outcomes due to information security threats. Yet many 
users do not use these tools and practices. We seek to understand the factors influencing 
organizational users’ adoption of preventive information security behaviors. These 
behaviors are similar to those which individuals practice to prevent negative health 
outcomes. A new model incorporating the primary antecedents of users’ intentions 
related to preventive security, the Preventive Adoption Model (PAM), is presented and 
tested. PAM is derived from health behavior theories (health belief model, protection 
motivation theory, and theory of planned behavior) and integrates key constructs 
specific to the information security context. Results of the study suggest that users’ 
beliefs regarding the threats and their avoidability, the proposed preventive actions, 
and their individual capabilities have an impact on their intentions to perform the 
prescribed behaviors. 
Keywords:  IS threat prevention, information security behaviors, security beliefs, Preventive 
Adoption Model, Health Belief Model, Prevention Motivation Theory 
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Introduction 
“Various technologies are being brought to bear for security purposes, but if your end users are 
careless with their information or capabilities to get into applications, it will not matter whether 
you have state-of-the-art security technology in place” (Von Solms 2001). 
This quote highlights what many information security (infosec) experts have suggested for years: the 
weakest link in any security plan or procedure is the users themselves. It is the rare user that is completely 
aware of the latest in security risks and the often simple techniques for preventing them. Instead, many 
users simply do not engage in preventive computer security practices and behaviors. For example, many 
recent attempted attacks have been “spear phishing” seeking to exploit a known vulnerability in 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 6 although newer versions of the software exist along with patches to close 
the vulnerability. This practice allowed a hacker to access Google’s systems in late 2009. Other high-
profile attacks include:  
In 2008, a Virginia investment firm accidentally exposed a number of private files to the outside 
world, including files containing the name and social security number of 2000 clients such as 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer.  
Also in 2008, computers at the campaign headquarters of presidential candidates Barack Obama and 
John McCain were hacked, apparently by a foreign attacker looking for policy documentation 
(Whitehouse et al. 2010).  
These attacks exemplify the serious threats that are detrimental to the ability of individuals and 
organizations to secure and retain control of their information assets. Although there is no way to 
completely safeguard all of the information stored on an organization’s information systems (IS), there 
are a number of ways that the volume of these attacks can be reduced. Recently, a group of United States 
Senators (Whitehouse et al. 2010) and a coalition of 28 commercial and governmental organizations 
(including Facebook, IBM, Microsoft, and the FBI) led an effort urging consumers to be mindful of ways 
to protect themselves, their employers, and the Internet community at large against cybercrimes.  
Similar educational and promotional efforts aimed at reducing behavioral health risks such as tobacco 
usage, sedentary lifestyles, unhealthy diets, and alcohol usage have been relatively common for several 
decades (Glanz et al. 2008). The goal is to influence individuals to change their behaviors voluntarily in 
ways conducive to optimal health. These interventions are based on a number of health behavior theories 
which were developed to explain and influence the desired changes among a targeted set of individuals.  
Similarities between preventive health behaviors and preventive security behaviors allow IS researchers to 
leverage similar behavioral theories to explain why many users do not engage in practices which would 
reduce or eliminate many of the risks associated with infosec threats such as viruses, spyware, and 
phishing. Recently, research articles have highlighted efforts to adapt these health behavior theories to the 
practice of preventive information security behaviors. These adaptations have been based on theories 
such as the Health Belief Model, the Protection Motivation Theory, and the Theory of Planned Behavior.  
Adapting prominent models from the health behavior literature we develop a new model of preventive 
information security behaviors. This model utilizes concepts and relationships from health behavior 
theories to explain users’ adoption of information security practices. The model is empirically tested using 
survey data collected from 256 users across organizations. 
Health Behavior Theories 
A preventive innovation is an adoption made at a given point in time to avoid or lower the probability of 
an event occurring in the future (Rogers 1995, p.70). Generally, these innovations have a slow rate of 
diffusion for several reasons. The necessity for the innovation is uncertain because we cannot say for sure 
that the negative event would have ever happened. If the preventive actions are in fact needed at some 
point, it may not happen until much later, which reduces any immediately perceived benefits. Further, the 
costs of prevention may be so high as to approach any possible losses or consequences. Individuals are 
often reluctant to adopt preventive innovations because of a combination of unpleasant, costly, or difficult 
behavioral changes along with an uncertain probability of any adverse circumstances occurring. 
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Two contexts in which such preventive innovations commonly exist are health care and information 
security. In both areas, individuals are susceptible to various intrusions or attacks, which may result in a 
wide range of potentially adverse circumstances. Many of these attacks can be thwarted by the internal 
systems and defensive mechanisms of the human body or the information system, respectively. However, 
these responsive measures are not always fully capable of defending every possible negative action. Many 
times, the most effective (if not the only) means of addressing these attacks involves specific behavioral 
practices or habits that either avoid the negative outcomes altogether or at least minimize their negative 
impacts. For health prevention, this includes such behaviors as regular medical checkups, dietary habits, 
immunizations, and the avoidance of risky behaviors (e.g. smoking, excessive drinking, driving without a 
seat belt, etc.). For information security specific behavioral practices include password management, 
email activities, and internet-surfing behaviors, the installation of defensive software tools, and automatic 
software updates for installed software applications and operating systems. 
The health prevention and information security fields are both engaged in research efforts to increase the 
adoption of these preventive behaviors. Given the common goal of understanding and promoting 
“healthier” behaviors, we propose that research to understand the adoption of preventive information 
security behaviors can benefit from adopting theories explaining the adoption of preventive health 
behaviors. For this, we look to reference theories proposed in the preventive health behavior literature. 
Health prevention research has focused on the behavioral issues associated with (among other things) 
ways to increase the adoption of measures intended to decrease the likelihood of occurrence of various 
illnesses and accidents. The most commonly applied preventive health behavior theories are the Health 
Belief Model (Rosenstock 1966; Rosenstock 1974), the Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers 1975; Rogers 
1983), and the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991). Next we examine each of these theories en route 
to the development of a research model to investigate preventive information security behaviors. 
The Health Belief Model (HBM) posits that an individual’s likelihood to engage in preventive health 
behaviors such as health screenings, flu vaccinations, and dental checkups is a function of the perceived 
threat of the illness or condition to be avoided and the net benefit to the individual  (Rosenstock 1974). 
Threat assessment is evaluated as the perceived severity and susceptibility of the condition to be avoided, 
whereas the benefits or efficacy of the preventive behaviors are evaluated net of perceived barriers to 
performing these behaviors (in terms of cost, effort, difficulty, access, etc.). It was also theorized that an 
additional stimulus or “cue to action” is required to trigger the actualization of the behavior.  
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) theorizes that a person’s motivation to engage in self-protective 
behaviors is based on two cognitive processes: threat appraisal and coping appraisal (Prentice-Dunn and 
Rogers 1986; Rogers 1983). The threat appraisal process consists of assessing the severity and 
vulnerability of failing to engage in the self-protective behavior. Severity assesses the degree of harm that 
results from not engaging in the self-protective behavior, while vulnerability assesses the likelihood that 
such harm will occur. The process also involves assessing the rewards of engaging in maladaptive 
behaviors (e.g. the rewards of not giving up smoking). The rewards are offset by the perceived severity and 
vulnerability of any resulting threats. Threat appraisal is the sum of these factors. Coping appraisal is the 
sum of the individual’s judgments regarding the effectiveness of the preventive behavior (response 
efficacy) and their ability to perform the behavior successfully (self-efficacy), minus any costs of doing so 
(such as inconvenience, expense, or difficulty). Threat appraisal and coping appraisal are combined to 
form an individual’s protection motivation, which is most often measured as behavioral intention. 
PMT is most often measured as six antecedents (severity, susceptibility, fear or threat, self-efficacy, 
response efficacy or effectiveness, and costs) directly associated with intention to perform a given 
protective behavior, whether avoiding a maladaptive response or initiating an adaptive response. A recent 
meta-analysis, found all six antecedents to be significantly associated with intentions  (Milne et al. 2000).  
Lastly, the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), while a general theoretical framework of behavior, has been 
used by researchers investigating the adoption of health behaviors, including smoking, contraceptive use, 
exercise behavior, and kidney donation. TPB extends the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) to include 
behaviors that are not completely under an individual’s deliberate or volitional control. As with TRA, an 
individual’s attitude toward a given behavior and the perceived subjective norms associated with the 
 Wynn et al. / Preventive Adoption Model 
  
 Thirty Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Milan 2013 4 
behavior (including all relevant referents) influence the actual intentions to perform that behavior. 
Attitude is a function of the relevant beliefs about the behavior and its consequences. Likewise, subjective 
norm is a function of the beliefs that specific important to the individual parties think the individual 
should perform the behavior. Additionally, TPB incorporates perceived behavioral control which is the 
individual’s “perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behavior” (Ajzen 1991). This construct is a 
function of the control beliefs a person has regarding their control over performing the behavior, 
including past experiences and anticipated obstacles, and it is a direct antecedent of behavioral intentions. 
Application of Health Behavior Theories to Information Security 
Information security research has leveraged the health behavior models extensively (see review in 
Crossler et al. 2013) to propose numerous models and a wide range of constructs that may possibly 
influence an individual’s decision to adopt or not adopt preventive information security behaviors .This  
focused primarily on PMT (e.g. Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Johnston and 
Warkentin 2010; Lee and Larsen 2009b; Liang and Xue 2009; Liang and Xue 2010; Siponen et al. 2010), 
and, to a lesser extent HBM (Davinson and Sillence 2010; Ng et al. 2009). This situation parallels the 
preventive health behaviors research. As a result, health behavior researchers have called for integration 
of components from various theories to explain specific behaviors (e.g., Fishbein et al. 2001; Maddux and 
DuCharme 1997). In so doing, proposed research models can be comprehensive enough to capture a wide 
range of individual’s beliefs regarding their abilities, the existence and seriousness of specific threats, the 
effectiveness of methods of preventing the threats, and the constraints associated with these methods. 
PAM responds to this situation by presenting the core constructs, derived from the primary health 
behavior models and extant IS research, in a comprehensive model of information security behaviors.   
The extant research presents several issues to consider regarding the drivers of information security 
behaviors. First, the theoretical foundation used for these studies varies widely. A number of theories have 
been proposed as support for the articles’ research models, including TPB, HBM, and PMT along with 
General Deterrence Theory (GDT), Diffusion of Innovation (Rogers 1995), and the Theory of 
Interpersonal Behavior (Triandis 1980). Also, some researchers have chosen to focus on the effects of 
these constructs as antecedents to intentions, some directly to behaviors, and others including both. This 
is consistent with the health behavior literature, since neither HBM nor PMT include intentions directly. 
This is complicated by varying definitions of intentions/behaviors across papers, and the inclusion of 
multiple forms of intentions (Anderson and Agarwal 2010) and multiple behaviors (Workman et al. 
2008). As a result, the resulting explained variance (R2) for studies in the information security literature 
ranges from 0.21-0.78 for intentions and 0.21-0.79 for behaviors. 
Over 40 different constructs have been proposed as antecedents to intentions or behaviors. Of these, five 
constructs are the most common and can be thought to be at the core of security research based on the 
health behavior models: susceptibility, severity, cost, response efficacy, and self-efficacy. The results for 
these core constructs alone vary across studies. For instance, response efficacy is significant in 10 studies 
in which it is measured, while susceptibility has only been found significant in 6 of the 9 studies in which 
it is measured. Similar inconsistencies exist in the PMT and HBM literature, in which these constructs 
also vary in significance and effect size (Floyd et al. 2000; Milne et al. 2000; Sheeran and Abraham 1996).  
The applicability of these theories to health and security behaviors depends on a set of underlying 
assumptions that individuals are motivated to perform a preventive action by a desire to avoid or reduce 
the negative consequences associated with some anticipated event or outcome (Weinstein 1993). This 
motivation depends upon the individual’s assessment of the impact and likelihood of the event and its 
consequences. The motivation to perform a given action also depends on the individual’s belief regarding 
the effectiveness of the action in reducing its impact or likelihood, and the anticipated barriers to action. 
These common assumptions result in a number of conceptually similar, but differently named 
components which address a common set of antecedents to preventive behavior intentions: impact, 
likelihood, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and barriers (see Table 1). In HBM and PMT, the impact and 
likelihood are measured directly as severity and susceptibility, while the individual’s belief in the efficacy 
of the prescribed preventive actions is reflected in the response efficacy (PMT) or perceived benefits 
(HBM) constructs. In TPB, the assessments of impact, likelihood, and response efficacy are all reflected in 
the items used to measure individual’s attitude toward certain behaviors. With the addition of self-efficacy 
to revisions of HBM (Sheeran and Abraham 1996) and PMT (Rogers 1983), it is also included in all three 
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theories.  Each theory also includes a measure of the barriers associated with performing a given action. 
HBM defines this simply as perceived barriers, whereas PMT defines it as response costs along with 
measures of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. TPB includes barriers in perceived behavioral control as an 
external control factor along with other facilitating conditions (Straub and Welke 1998) whereas it 
includes self-efficacy as an internal control factor. 
Table 1: Similar Constructs In Health Behavior Theories and the Preventive Adoption 
Model 
Theory Impact Likelihood Response 
Efficacy 
Self-
Efficacy 
Barriers Other 
HBM Severity Susceptibility Benefits Self-efficacy Cost Cue to Action 
PMT Severity Vulnerability Response 
Efficacy 
Self-efficacy Cost, intrinsic 
rewards, 
extrinsic 
rewards 
  
TPB (Attitude) (Attitude) (Attitude) Perceived 
Behavioral 
Control (Self-
efficacy) 
Perceived 
Behavioral 
Control 
(Facilitating 
Conditions) 
Subjective Norms 
PAM Severity (to 
Individual, to 
Organization) 
Susceptibility Avoidability, 
Response 
Efficacy 
Self-efficacy Cost, 
Facilitating 
Conditions 
Cue to Action, 
Subjective Norms, 
Ease of Use, 
Compatibility  
Preventive Adoption Model 
Leveraging the theories of preventive health behaviors, and consistent with prior research applying these 
theories to the information security context, we developed the Preventive Adoption Model (PAM). PAM 
establishes a comprehensive and parsimonious nomology describing the antecedents of individual 
intentions to engage in preventive information security behaviors. The model integrates constructs from 
research in preventive health behavior and TPB with other constructs endemic to IS.  Specifically, PAM 
includes severity, susceptibility, avoidability, response efficacy, costs, and cue to action from HBM and 
PMT. It also includes subjective norms, self-efficacy, and facilitating conditions from TPB, along with ease 
of use and compatibility from the information systems technology acceptance literature. This integration 
of constructs is consistent with suggestions from the health behavior literature (e.g., Fishbein et al. 2001; 
Maddux and DuCharme 1997), while integrating constructs from existing IS literature that are more 
relevant to the use of preventive information security behaviors. The resulting model is thus more 
appropriate for explaining individuals’ information security behavioral intentions than the health 
behaviors upon which it is based. The research model guiding our study is shown in Figure 1, along with 
the origin of the various antecedents. Next, we discuss the constructs and hypothesized relationships 
which comprise the model. 
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Figure 1. Preventive Adoption Model 
Severity 
An individual’s perceived severity is an assessment of the adverse consequences associated with a given 
event.  This assessment includes not only the technological consequences that may arise (e.g. loss of data, 
misappropriation of private information), but also psychological, social, or economic consequences (e.g. 
loss of job, impaired communications). In many cases of an information security problem, the adverse 
consequences on the organization may be distinctly different from the impact on the individual. The 
individual’s perceptions of the severity to him-/herself and to the organization are two distinctly different, 
but related, things. As such, severity is conceptualized as a second-order formatively measured construct 
comprised of two dimensions: an individual’s beliefs about the negative impact a security violation would 
have on the individual, and the impact a security violation would have on the organization in which an 
individual works. Other contexts may involve additional dimensions (e.g. severity to the customer, to 
one’s home nation, or society as a whole.). However, we have chosen to examine this concept in relation to 
those factors that are most likely to have an effect on an individual employee’s behaviors in an 
organizational context. Other dimensions may prove to be worth examining in future research studies. 
In meta-analyses of HBM (Sheeran and Abraham 1996) and PMT (Milne et al. 2000), perceived severity 
was found to be among the least-often significant antecedents to intentions or behaviors. However, the 
extant IS literature has generally found severity to influence intentions (Ifinedo 2012; Komatsu et al. 
2013; Siponen et al. 2010). Thus, we hypothesize that as the degree of perceived severity of a given 
outcome increases, an individual’s intentions to exercise behaviors which are likely to prevent the 
undesirable information security incidents from occurring will increase.   
H1: The individual’s overall perceived severity of outcomes related to particular security violations 
are positively associated with the individual’s intentions to perform preventive security 
behaviors. 
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Susceptibility 
Perceived susceptibility is the subjective probability of experiencing a security violation. This probability 
is manifest in varying degrees, from outright denial that a given computer is susceptible to an information 
security threat (which is legitimate only for isolated devices not accessible to others or connected to any 
external data or network) to an irrational over-anticipation of susceptibility (similar to hypochondria in 
medicine). Individuals’ assessments of their susceptibility are often affected by an unrealistic optimism 
that allows them to conclude that “It won’t happen to me” (Weinstein 1984; Weinstein 1987), despite the 
actual risk. Among other reasons, this bias may be result of a desire to avoid anxiety associated with 
admitting vulnerability, an effort to maintain one’s self-esteem, or cognitive errors such as believing that 
one is immune to a hazard since it hasn’t happened so far (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Weinstein 1987). 
The more an individual believes he or she is somehow vulnerable to a given negative outcome, they are 
more likely to feel it necessary to prevent such behaviors from occurring. 
Perceived susceptibility has a mixed review in the health behavior literature, where it has been found to be 
an often insignificant antecedent of intentions or behaviors in a review of PMT (Milne et al. 2000), but the 
second most-often significant antecedents in a review of HBM (Sheeran and Abraham 1996). 
Susceptibility was also found to be an insignificant antecedent in several of the information security 
behavior articles reviewed. Given the inconsistency of findings, it is possible that susceptibility operates in 
concert with other factors to influence preventive adoption intentions. Despite the inconsistent findings, 
the theoretical rationale for the relationship suggests that as perceived susceptibility increases, intentions 
to do something to prevent the negative outcome from occurring also increase. 
H2: An individual’s perceived susceptibility to particular security violations is positively associated 
with intentions to perform preventive security behaviors. 
Avoidability 
Perceived avoidability is the individual’s belief that a security threat can be successfully avoided (Liang 
and Xue 2010). An information system user’s confidence that she can act in ways which may prevent or 
mitigate a given security violation has a significant effect on their intentions to carry out preventive 
behaviors. If an individual does not believe that a given negative outcome is avoidable, there is less 
motivation to carry out the associated preventive security behaviors. As such, perceived avoidability is an 
indication of the control which users have in determining the outcome of a given threat (Liang and Xue 
2009). Thus, higher perceived avoidability increases their intentions to perform the preventive security 
behaviors. 
H3: Higher perceptions of security violation avoidability are positively associated with an individual’s 
intentions to perform preventive security behaviors. 
In addition, we propose that perceived avoidability negatively moderates the relationships between a 
user’s perceptions of both severity and susceptibility of potential security violations and the intentions to 
perform preventive security behaviors. IS users may perceive security risks to be avoidable for a variety of 
reasons such as lack of experience with certain types of threats, misplaced optimism that “it won’t happen 
to me” (Weinstein 1987), choosing an alternative approach to satisfy system needs, or by enacting specific 
preventive behaviors. The perception of control to avoid the information security violation undermines 
assessments of the nature of the threat including minimizing risks associated with a known threat (Liang 
and Xue 2010; Weinstein 1987). For example, Apple computer users frequently do not install antivirus 
software even though malware is a known and potentially severe threat (Schofield 2010).  Using an 
alternative computing platform provides means to avoid the potential threat regardless of its prevalence 
and potential negative consequences.  Thus, we posit: 
H4: The influence of severity on preventive adoption intentions is negatively moderated by 
avoidability such that the positive relationship between severity and intentions is weaker the 
more an individual believes a security violation can be avoided. 
H5: The influence of susceptibility on preventive adoption intentions is negatively moderated by 
avoidability such that the positive relationship between susceptibility and intentions is weaker 
the more an individual a security violation can be avoided. 
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Response Efficacy 
For the recognition of the severity and susceptibility of a given threat to lead to a change in behaviors, an 
individual must also believe that their actions will somehow address the threat. Response Efficacy is the 
individual’s beliefs regarding the effectiveness of the alternative responses available for reducing an 
information security threat. This differs conceptually from the beliefs about avoiding the negative 
outcomes of a particular threat. Instead, response efficacy (or perceived benefits in HBM) refers to the 
efficacy of the preventive behaviors themselves, i.e. doing things that keep information security breaches 
from occurring. These behaviors relate to both the required administrative or operational actions and the 
act of installing and executing the required technological tools. Previous information security behavior 
research has typically found response efficacy (or perceived benefits) to be a significant factor in 
determining intentions and behaviors (e.g., Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Lee and Larsen 2009a). Thus, 
we propose that the greater the benefits an individual perceives resulting from engaging in preventive 
security behaviors, the higher the likelihood they will intend to exercise the behaviors. 
H6: An individual’s perceptions of the response efficacy of preventive behaviors are positively 
associated with intentions to perform preventive security behaviors. 
Costs 
The value of the response efficacy is typically weighed against any perceived tangible or psychological 
costs which may impede the preventive behaviors from being executed. These costs are related to 
performing the preventive security behaviors, not the costs associated with negative outcomes of an 
information security breach, which are captured through the individual’s perceptions of the severity of a. 
Costs include the financial resources needed, the time required, and the perceived inconvenience 
associated with performing the recommended preventive behaviors. As perceived costs increase, an 
individual is less likely to be motivated to carry out the preventive actions. For example, if expected 
benefits associated with preventing a given security threat are fully offset or exceeded by the costs of these 
preventions, an individual is less likely to be motivated to perform the necessary preventive behaviors. 
H7: An individual’s perceived costs of preventive security behaviors are negatively associated with 
their intentions to perform preventive security behaviors. 
Cue to Action 
Cue to action (CTA) is the least studied construct in HBM (Rosenstock et al. 1994) despite anecdotal 
evidence supporting its importance in stimulating the decision to act upon a given set of beliefs. Salient 
cues such as expert recommendations, media messages, or experiences (both personal and vicarious) 
serve as triggers prompting an individual to take the recommended actions (Rosenstock et al. 1994). 
Though typically cues to action prompt individuals to transform their intentions into actual behavior 
(Webb and Sheeran 2004), they may also influence the development of intentions to perform the 
preventive behavior. Such cues, which can include relevant experiences that demonstrate reduced 
performance or undesirable results associated with an information security failure, influence one’s 
predisposition to perform the behavior in the near future. For example, when a friend shares that his 
computer was compromised through a Trojan horse and sensitive company information has been 
accessed (a cue to action), one is more likely to form intentions to keep their antivirus software up to date. 
Hence, we posit: 
H8: Cue to action is positively related to a user’s intentions to perform preventive information 
security behaviors. 
Self-Efficacy 
Self-efficacy is the individual’s belief that he or she is capable of performing the behavior in question. 
Individuals with high self-efficacy are more likely to persist and to expend more effort in the face of any 
problems or obstacles that they may encounter (Bandura 1977). Self-efficacy is indicative of an 
individual’s beliefs about their ability to competently perform preventive security behaviors and use 
preventive security tools (Compeau and Higgins 1995). In the information security behavior literature, 
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self-efficacy has been found to be significantly associated with both intentions (e.g., Johnston and 
Warkentin 2010; Liang and Xue 2010) and behaviors (e.g., Ng et al. 2009; Workman et al. 2008). In the 
health behavior literature, self-efficacy is most often associated with an individual’s formation of 
intentions rather than directly impacting the performance of behaviors directly (Fishbein et al. 2001).  
This is consistent with the notion that an individual would hardly intend to do something that he or she 
did not believe they could actually do. Thus, we theorize that higher levels of self-efficacy are associated 
with increased intentions to perform the given behavior. 
H9: Higher self-efficacy is positively associated with the individual’s intentions to perform preventive 
security behaviors.  
Compatibility 
Compatibility is defined as “the perceived cognitive distance between an innovation and precursor 
methods for accomplishing tasks.” (Rogers 1995, p. 224). In the context of the present study, a compatible 
preventive information security behavior would fit better with the individual’s work practices, thus 
decreasing the amount of change in one’s work practices that is entailed in its enactment. The converse is 
that some  information security practices often have unanticipated consequences which often affect the 
flexibility and adaptability of both individual and organization (Baskerville 1995). An individual may 
intend to perform a particular preventive security behavior. However, if the behavior is perceived to be 
disruptive to normal work patterns and causes significant change to how individuals typically work and to 
what they can do, these perceived intended and unintended consequences can influence their intentions 
to engage in such information security behaviors. As such, we hypothesize that compatibility positively 
affects user intentions to perform preventive security behaviors. 
H10: Compatibility of a preventive information security behavior with an individual’s work practices 
is positively associated with the individual’s intentions to perform preventive security 
behaviors. 
Subjective Norms, Facilitating Conditions and Ease of Use 
The relationships between subjective norms, facilitating conditions and ease of use and intentions have 
been established in the extant literature. Due to space limitations, the justifications for these hypotheses 
are not provided but the hypotheses are included for integrity of the nomological network.   
H11: Higher levels of perceived normative support are positively associated with an individual’s 
intentions to perform preventive security behaviors.  
H12: Higher levels of conditions perceived to facilitate the conduct of preventive security behaviors 
will be positively associated with an individual’s intentions to perform preventive security 
behaviors.   
H13: Perceived ease of use is positively associated with the individual’s intentions to perform 
preventive security behaviors. 
Research Methodology 
Construct Operationalization 
We adapted the majority of our measures from existing validated scales in the health behavior and 
information security literature. The items for susceptibility, severity, response efficacy, and costs were 
adapted from a time-tested set of items for HBM (Champion 1984). Items for facilitating conditions and 
subjective norms were adapted from the corresponding measures in TPB literature (Ajzen 1991). We 
adapted items from Compeau and Higgins (1995) to measure self-efficacy, and items from Karahanna, 
Straub, and Chervany (1999) to measure compatibility. Items for ease of use, intentions, and behavior, 
were based on measures from Davis et al (1989). The specific security behaviors chosen were selected 
based on a review of the practitioner literature and the results of six semi-structured interviews conducted 
with both IS and non-IS professional and administrative staff at a large public university in the southern 
United States. The items for avoidability were developed to be consistent with the conceptual definition as 
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proposed in Liang and Xue (2009) and in response to their call for development of measures of perceived 
avoidability (Liang and Xue 2010). The items for cue to action were adapted for the current context from 
similar measures in the health behavior literature (e.g. Janz and Becker 1984).  
We conducted a pilot study to test item wording and online delivery of the survey. The survey was 
distributed to approximately 100 professionals, working in both IT and non-IT roles, at a large public 
university in the southern United States. Based on the pilot, we clarified wording of several items and 
revised the web-based survey to simplify delivery. The full list of items is available upon request.  
Severity and preventive adoption intentions are modeled as formatively measured constructs. 
Understanding these constructs is a primary focus of this study; and this formative modeling allows the 
constructs to be specified, measured and analyzed more effectively (Petter et al. 2007). Additionally, 
severity is modeled as a second-order formative construct with two first-order reflective dimensions of 
severity to the organization and severity to the individual.     
A wide variety of information security threats have been the focus of study in the extant literature. For 
example, Liang and Xue (2010) studied intentions and behaviors associated with spyware, Anderson and 
Agarwal (2010) assessed security intentions associated with home use of computers and the Internet, and 
Ng et al (2009) studied security behaviors associated with email usage. Our focus addresses the potential 
threat of unauthorized access to a workplace computer used for business purposes. The behavioral 
intentions of interest address separate and distinct actions that individual users may take to protect a 
work PC from unauthorized access (updating operating system software, using protection software, and 
logging off the PC when unattended). While not necessarily comprehensive in scope for all organizational 
users’ protection-motivated behaviors (Posey et al. 2013), the measures we have included as formative 
dimensions are consistent with and adequately capture our context: unauthorized access to a work PC.   
The choice to model behavioral intentions and severity as formatively measured constructs also satisfies 
the decision rules established by Jarvis et al. (2003). First, the direction of causality leads from the 
underlying dimensions to each construct. For example, changes in severity to the individual would cause 
severity to change but the reverse may not be the case. Second, the underlying dimensions are not 
interchangeable as they represent conceptually different aspects of each construct. For example, each 
preventive adoption action is a separate aspect of the behavioral intention construct – using protection 
software is not a substitute for logging of an unattended PC.  Third, changes in one dimension are not 
likely to be linked to changes in the other dimensions, i.e., the dimensions should not have substantial 
covariation.  In the case of severity, changes in severity to the organization would not be expected to 
correlate with changes in individual severity. And lastly, the antecedents and consequents of the 
dimensions are likely to be different. For instance, individual severity will relate to job specific demands 
associated with unauthorized access to an employee’s work PC whereas organizational severity is likely to 
reflect liability associated with the consequences of the unauthorized access. 
Sample/Data Collection 
Survey data were collected from personnel in different business organizations in a major metropolitan 
area in India. Respondents were working individuals who use a computer as part of their daily job. 
Working professionals in India were identified as a sample population for testing the research model 
because India represents an environment where personal computer use in the workplace, while extensive, 
is much less saturated than in the United States or European countries, and the associated messaging 
regarding safe computer practices is much less prevalent.  
A highly reputable survey panel company located in India collected the data for the study. A total of 2000 
employees from a wide-range of companies who use a computer for their work received a paper copy of 
the survey with a pre-addressed return envelope. The survey was accompanied with a cover letter 
providing respondents with instructions to complete the survey, as well as a website link which they could 
use to complete the survey online instead of using the paper survey. Each survey was assigned a unique 
identification number, thus avoiding the possibility of duplication. Survey participation was encouraged 
by an optional raffle offering two 10,000 rupees prizes (approximately $220 USD). Survey respondents 
were guaranteed anonymity and raffle entries were maintained separately from survey response data. 
The survey was conducted over a period of 45 days, after which a total of 312 surveys are received.  After 
the initial mailing, a reminder was sent after approximately 25 days. A total of 150 surveys were 
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completed online and the remaining 162 were received on paper. We received 159 surveys from the initial 
mailing and 97 following the reminder. We eliminated 38 online surveys due to missing data or 
inappropriate completion times, resulting in 112 online surveys. Additionally, 18 paper surveys were 
eliminated for excessive missing data and duplicate responses, resulting in 144 useable paper surveys. The 
final usable responses were 256, giving a response rate of 12.8%. Descriptive statistics for both formats 
and the pre- and post-reminder groups, as indicated in Table 2, show no significant differences.  
In order to test the responses for non-response bias, early completions are compared against late 
completions and findings show no significant differences between the two groups. 
Table 2. Sample Demographics. 
 Online (112) Paper (144) Pre-Reminder (159) Post-Reminder (97) 
Age 31.3 years 29.7 years 30.5 yrs 30.2 yrs 
Years of Computer Experience 6.9 years 6.3 years 6.6 yrs 6.5 yrs 
Years of Total Experience 8.7 years 7.5 years 8.0 yrs 8.0 yrs 
Work in IT Dept. 56.7% 47.8% 52.5% 50.5% 
Use PC regularly at work 96.2% 97% 97.2% 95.9% 
Have internet access at work 99.0% 99.3% 99.3% 68.0% 
Position–Sr. Mgr. / Executive 25.0% 20.1% 22.0% 22.7% 
Position – Supervisor/ Mgr. 21.4% 16.7% 15.1% 24.7% 
Position–Engineer/Tech Spec 34.8% 36.1% 33.3% 39.2% 
Position–Analyst/Prof. Staff 10.7% 20.1% 17.6% 12.4% 
Position – Admin/Office Staff 5.4% 6.9% 6.3% 6.2% 
Analysis and Results 
We analyzed the theoretical model using partial least squares (PLS) in SmartPLS 2.0 (M3) Beta (Ringle et 
al. 2005). Our research model is complex combining a many constructs and structural paths with the 
second-order construct Severity. PLS is well suited for these complex relationships (Gefen et al. 2011). 
Measurement Model Validation 
For the reflectively measured constructs, convergent and discriminant validity and reliability tests are 
used to evaluate the psychometric properties of the measurement model. As shown in Table 6, all scales 
exhibited adequate reliability with composite reliability scores exceeding the generally accepted guideline 
of 0.70 and average variance extracted (AVE) exceeding 0.50 (Fornell and Larcker 1981; Nunnally 1978).  
To assess the convergent and discriminant validity of the reflective measures, we look for measures to 
load more on their hypothesized construct than on other constructs (Gefen et al. 2011) and for the square 
root of AVE to exceed other inter-construct correlations (Chin 2010). Confirmatory factor analysis in PLS 
should also show item cross-loadings of less than 0.50 (Chin 2010). The measures show adequate 
convergent and discriminant validity (see Tables 3 and 4). 
Table 3. Item Loadings and Cross-Loadings 
 Avoid Comp Cost CTA EOU FC REff SE SInd SOrg SN SUSC 
AVOID1 0.69 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.23 0.00 0.10 0.27 -0.01 -0.20 
AVOID2 0.80 -0.07 0.02 0.08 0.26 0.25 0.29 -0.02 0.04 0.34 0.14 -0.03 
AVOID3 0.72 -0.11 -0.14 -0.07 0.26 0.16 0.30 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.21 -0.09 
COMP1 -0.09 1.00 -0.51 0.01 -0.21 0.17 0.08 0.09 -0.34 -0.17 -0.03 -0.27 
COST1 -0.01 -0.41 0.86 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.18 0.07 0.30 
COST2 -0.10 -0.40 0.73 0.10 -0.13 -0.26 -0.10 -0.09 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.10 
CTA_A 0.03 0.01 0.23 1.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.20 
EOU1 0.28 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.92 0.23 0.42 0.08 0.17 0.21 0.28 0.00 
EOU2 0.26 -0.33 -0.07 -0.09 0.71 0.08 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.23 0.11 
FC1 0.15 0.14 -0.15 -0.01 0.29 0.86 0.47 0.26 0.13 0.12 0.39 0.01 
FC2 0.21 0.13 -0.08 -0.01 0.12 0.77 0.40 0.50 0.14 0.17 0.54 -0.17 
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FC3 0.24 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.81 0.39 0.41 0.09 0.23 0.56 -0.07 
RespEff1 0.30 0.21 -0.17 -0.03 0.37 0.32 0.74 0.24 0.01 0.32 0.25 -0.10 
RespEff2 0.21 -0.10 -0.06 -0.11 0.37 0.31 0.62 0.41 0.17 0.25 0.36 0.08 
RespEff3 0.29 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.20 0.49 0.83 0.39 0.10 0.22 0.44 -0.03 
SE1 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.35 0.39 0.97 0.01 0.18 0.41 0.00 
SE2 0.16 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.17 0.53 0.46 0.75 0.19 0.20 0.62 0.03 
SInd1 0.04 -0.22 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.78 0.31 0.14 0.27 
SInd2 0.08 -0.38 0.16 0.09 0.23 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.84 0.42 0.20 0.27 
SInd3 0.06 -0.24 0.20 0.11 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.87 0.42 0.29 0.37 
SOrg1 0.22 -0.09 0.22 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.06 0.36 0.72 0.15 0.12 
SOrg2 0.25 -0.17 0.12 0.07 0.24 0.24 0.31 0.16 0.37 0.82 0.31 0.11 
SOrg3 0.38 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.24 0.16 0.29 0.15 0.38 0.77 0.30 0.14 
SOrg4 0.24 -0.19 0.21 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.77 0.23 0.10 
SN1 0.20 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.29 0.56 0.44 0.46 0.19 0.29 0.95 0.07 
SN2 0.09 -0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.25 0.46 0.40 0.46 0.33 0.29 0.82 0.01 
SUSC1 -0.12 -0.27 0.26 0.20 0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.37 0.16 0.05 1.00 
Notes: Avoid=Avoidability; Comp=Compatibility; CTA=Cue-to-Action; EOU=Ease of Use; FC=Facilitating Conditions; RespEff=Response Efficacy; 
SE=Self Efficacy; SInd=Severity to Individual; SOrg=Severity to Organization; SUSC=Susceptibility; SN=Subjective Norms 
Three of the constructs in the study were based on single item measures, an acknowledged limitation. 
Cue-to-Action (CTA) used the average of responses to 3 dichotomous questions asking if the respondent 
had experienced particular cues in the past year (i.e., heard news about dangers of, someone known had 
experienced, and personally experienced unauthorized access). Both compatibility and susceptibility were 
originally modeled with two items, and in each case, an item was dropped for statistical reasons. 
The traditional methods of assessing validity for reflective measures are not appropriate for formative 
measures (Jarvis et al. 2003; Petter et al. 2007; Roberts and Thatcher 2009).  The first need is to establish 
the content validity of the items used to capture the domain of the construct (Straub et al. 2004). The 
items should represent a consensus covering the scope of the construct (Roberts and Thatcher 2009).  The 
items, as derived from the practitioner literature and interviews, identify the actions individuals are most 
commonly encouraged to take to promote information security by preventing unauthorized access to their 
work PC. The items were refined through the pilot study and adequately represent the construct domain. 
Table 4. Inter-construct Correlations and Composite Reliability 
Constructs CR (# items) Avoid Comp Cost CTA EOU FC Resp Eff SE 
Avoidability 0.78 (3) 0.74        
Compatibility n/a (1) -0.09 n/a       
Cost 0.78 (2) -0.06 -0.51 0.80      
Cue-to-Action n/a (1) 0.03 0.01 0.23 n/a     
Ease of Use 0.81 (2) 0.32 -0.21 -0.03 -0.04 0.82    
Fac. Cond. 0.85 (3) 0.23 0.17 -0.10 -0.01 0.21 0.82   
Resp. Efficacy 0.78 (3) 0.37 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.40 0.52 0.73  
Self Efficacy 0.86 (2) 0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.43 0.45 0.87 
Severity_Ind 0.87 (3) 0.07 -0.34 0.20 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.11 0.06 
Severity_Org 0.85 (4) 0.36 -0.17 0.17 0.08 0.22 0.21 0.35 0.20 
Susceptibility n/a (1) -0.12 -0.27 0.26 0.20 0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 
Subjective Norm 0.88 (2) 0.18 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.31 0.58 0.47 0.50 
Intentions1 n/a 0.11 -0.14 0.29 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.06 
Intentions2 n/a 0.17 -0.14 0.23 0.05 0.29 0.15 0.34 0.05 
Intentions3 n/a 0.29 0.12 -0.12 -0.09 0.24 0.16 0.26 0.13 
 
 Sev_I Sev_O Susc SN 
Severity_Ind 0.83    
Severity_Org 0.47 0.77   
Susceptibility 0.37 0.16 n/a  
Subjective Norm 0.26 0.32 0.05 0.89 
Intentions1 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.27 
Intentions2 0.25 0.41 0.35 0.26 
Intentions3 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 0.17 
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To establish evidence of construct validity, indicator weights, indicator loadings and absence of 
multicollinearity were evaluated (Cenfetelli and Bassellier 2009; Petter et al. 2007). Item loadings and 
weights for the formative constructs are shown in Table 5. The results indicate both absolute and relative 
importance for INT2, and absolute importance for INT1, and lack of absolute and relative importance for 
INT3 (Cenfetelli and Bassellier 2009). However, when an item lacks both absolute and relative 
importance in a statistical sense, the determination to maintain the formative item shifts to the theoretical 
relevance of the item. These three items represent fundamentally distinct security prevention behaviors 
that are not interchangeable. All three items were included as maintaining the content validity of the 
formative construct holds greater influence than the statistical results (Petter et al. 2007). We view all 
three items as integral components of intended security behaviors. The variance inflation factor (VIF) was 
used to evaluate multicollinearity.  The VIF values were less than 2.07 for the intention items, below the 
suggested threshold of 3.3 (Petter et al. 2007), thus demonstrating that multicollinearity is not a threat. 
Table 5. Outer Model Weights and Loadings 
Item Item 
Weights 
Standard 
Error 
T- 
Statistic 
Item 
Loadings 
Standard 
Error 
T-
Statistic 
INT1 0.238 0.224 1.061 0.814 0.181 4.511 
INT2 0.798 0.158 5.052 0.973 0.108 9.069 
INT3 0.143 0.185 0.770 0.175 0.221 0.794 
 
Severity was modeled as a second-order formative construct with severity to the individual and severity to 
the organization as its underlying dimensions. The paths of the underlying dimensions are both 
significant as are five of the seven path weights of the individual indicators on the second order construct. 
Per the recommendations of Wetzels et al. (2009), we conclude that severity is appropriately modeled.  
As with all research using self-reported data and all construct variables being measured through the same 
survey instrument, common method bias is a potential (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Several steps were taken 
to mitigate these concerns: the measures for the exogenous variables were separated in the survey from 
those for the endogenous constructs (Salancik and Pfeffer 1977); the survey was administered in two 
different forms with approximately half taking the survey online and half completing a paper-based 
version; and the survey started with a statement that the questions had no right or wrong answers so 
respondents could answer honestly, and that anonymity was assured (Podsakoff et al 2003). A post hoc 
statistical analysis to assess the presence of common method bias (i.e. Harman’s one-factor test) 
identified seven factors with the largest accounting for less than 25 percent of variance explained which is 
substantially below the 50 percent threshold, thus indicating common method bias is not a concern. 
Additionally, item level t-test comparisons between online and paper responses indicate no differences 
further minimizing method bias concerns. 
Structural Model Testing 
The full model was tested in PLS. The results are presented in Figure 2. The PAM model accounts for 56 
percent of the variance in preventive security behavior intentions. This demonstrates adequate 
explanatory power of the model (Hair et al. 1998). The results of the hypotheses tests are presented in 
Table 6 and show support for eight of the thirteen hypotheses. A post hoc statistical testing using G*Power 
3.1 (Faul et al. 2007) estimates a statistical power exceeding 0.99. 
The results are robust after controlling for age, computer experience and work experience. Age and work 
experience had no effect on preventive security behavior intentions. Computer experience influenced 
intentions such that more experienced computer users demonstrated lower intentions to engage in 
preventive security behaviors. 
The proposed interaction effects were evaluated using the product-indicator approach (Chin et al. 2003; 
Henseler et al. 2010). To reduce multicollinearity, the items were standardized prior to multiplication 
(Aiken et al. 1991). The interaction between avoidability and susceptibility is significant (b= - .22, p<0.01) 
as is the interaction between avoidability and severity (b = - .32, p<0.10). To evaluate the moderation 
effects, the effect size (f2) of the moderations was calculated by comparing R2 values between the main 
effects model and models with the moderations (Chin et al. 2003). We calculated f2 (see Table 7) for 
models with both interaction terms as well as each interaction term separately. These results provide 
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strong support for hypotheses H4 and H5. 
 
Table 6. Results by Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Support? Path/t-value/ 
Significance 
H1: Severity  Preventive Security Behavior Intentions No n.s. 
H2: Susceptibility  Preventive Security Behavior Intentions Yes β=0.29, t= 4.12, p<.001 
H3: Avoidability  Preventive Security Behavior Intentions Yes β=0.15, t=1.90, p<.05 
H4: Avoidability moderates Severity  Intentions Yes β= -0.32, t=1.43, p<.10 
H5: Avoidability moderates Susceptibility  Intentions Yes β= -0.22, t=3.08, p<.01 
H6: Response Efficacy  Preventive Security Behavior Intentions Yes β=0.22, t=2.95, p<.01 
H7: Costs  Preventive Security Behavior Intentions No β=0.19, t=2.46,  p<.01 
H8: Cue-to-Action  Preventive Security Behavior Intentions No n.s. 
H9: Self Efficacy  Preventive Security Behavior Intentions No n.s. 
H10: Subjective Norms  Preventive Security Behavior Intentions Yes β=0.11, t=1.35,  p<.10 
H11: Fac Conditions  Preventive Security Behavior Intentions  No n.s. 
H12: Compatibility  Preventive Security Behavior Intentions Yes β=0.09, t=1.51, p<.10 
H13: Ease of Use  Preventive Security Behavior Intentions Yes β=0.14, t=2.06,  p<.05 
 
Table 7. Interaction Effect Size 
Interaction Terms R2 (Intentions) Effect Size (f2)1 Magnitude 
Both 0.56 0.33 Medium-Large 
Avoidance x Severity 0.52 0.24 Medium-Large 
Avoidance x Susceptibility 0.48 0.14 Small-Med 
Base Model 0.42 -- -- 
Discussion and Implications 
This study proposes and empirically tests the Preventive Adoption Model (PAM). The extant IS literature 
shows a growing consensus that health behavior models offer many potential insights into the motivations 
driving information security behaviors. PAM integrates three health behavior theories (Health Belief 
Model, Prevention Motivation Theory, and the Theory of Planned Behavior) into a comprehensive yet 
parsimonious model for understanding the primary antecedents of preventive adoption intentions. The 
empirical test provides strong support for PAM in the study context, explaining 56 percent of the variance 
in intentions to perform security behaviors associated with preventing unauthorized access. 
Based on a sample of 237, eight of the thirteen hypotheses in PAM were supported. Specifically, as 
hypothesized, intentions to engage in preventive security behaviors are influenced by several constructs 
derived from the health behavior literature (perceived susceptibility, avoidability, response efficacy), the 
technology acceptance literature (ease of use, subjective norm, and compatibility), and the theory of 
planned behavior (subjective norms and compatibility).  
The direct relationship between severity and intentions (H1) was not significant. However, there was a 
significant moderating effect of avoidability on the relationship between severity and intentions (H4). The 
interaction graph (excluded for space considerations) indicates that when consequences are severe, 
people intend to engage in preventive security behaviors irrespective of level of avoidability. When 
consequences are low in severity, the level of avoidability determines the extent to which people intend to 
engage in security behaviors. Avoidability also had a significant moderating effect on the relationship 
between susceptibility and intentions (H5). This interaction graph suggests that when avoidability is high 
people intend to engage in preventive security behaviors irrespective of level of susceptibility. However 
                                                             
1
 ƒ² is calculated as: [R² (Interaction Model)–R² (Main Effects Model)]/[1 – R² (Main Effects Model)]. For ƒ², values 
of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 are considered to be small, medium, and large effect sizes respectively (Chin et al 2003). 
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when avoidability is low peoples’ intentions increase as level of susceptibility increases. 
The hypothesized relationship self-efficacy on preventive adoption intentions (H9) was not significant. A 
possible explanation may lie in the specific items used to measure self-efficacy. Our items captured the 
individual’s confidence relative to a general level of performing generic security behaviors as opposed to 
capturing self-efficacy with respect to specific behaviors related to preventing unauthorized access.  
The relationship between facilitating conditions and intentions (H12) was not supported. This indicates 
that the subjects were not influenced by the existence or non-existence of the necessary conditions for 
engaging in preventive behaviors. This may suggest that the security related software, tools, and support 
available are not viewed as enablers or obstacles because of their widespread availability.   Perceived cost 
was found to be significant, but with the opposite influence than was hypothesized, and thus H7 is not 
supported. This is not surprising, since hypotheses for perceived costs are frequently not supported within 
health behavior literature. It is also possible that the subjects are exhibiting psychological pricing (Kotler 
2003), in which customers use price or cost of a product or service as an indicator of quality (Erickson et 
al. 1985; Rao et al. 1989). Our subjects seem to assume that the higher the costs, the more effective the 
preventive behaviors. Finally, cue to action (H8) was not significant, which was not surprising based on 
inconsistent results from the HBM literature. Although the items included in the survey were tested in a 
pilot study and are consistent with previous research, we may not have captured the full range of possible 
cues sufficient to encourage the corresponding behaviors by the study participants. It is also possible that 
cues to action influence the enactment of behavior directly by prompting individuals to spring to action 
rather than influence the formation of behavior intentions. 
There are a number of limitations in this study that should be acknowledged. First, the data was collected 
based on a sample of professionals in India. While the language of daily business discourse is English, and 
efforts were made to ensure the survey verbiage utilized appropriate and generally accepted terminology, 
it is possible the findings have been influenced by culturally-based interpretations. Thus, care need be 
taken before generalizing the findings to other populations. Future research should replicate testing of 
PAM using both business and non-business computer users in a variety of cultural settings. 
Second, research suggests that individuals will respond to general information security threats, such as 
unauthorized access to a work computer, differently than to specific, single focused threats (e.g. viruses, 
hacks, or phishing/spam). We focused on behavioral intentions dealing with the more general 
conceptualization of threat of unauthorized access to one’s computer. Greater insights may be gained by 
incorporating a variety of information security threats and behavior-coping strategies into PAM. 
Lastly, cue to action (CTA) was calculated as the average of three dichotomous indicators. Several factors 
could influence the extent to which various cues actually motivate preventive behavior intentions that may 
be obscured by our measure. We used a timeframe of one year for a cue. More timely cues may actually 
exert greater influence. The consequences faced by others acting as a cue to action may also determine the 
strength of the prompt. Our measures focused on only negative consequences from unauthorized access. 
Different situational cues may influence individuals to either engage in cognitive decision making 
processes or to engage in specific behaviors (Maddux et al. 1997). Future research should seek to clarify 
the existence and impact of situational cues to action, and cues to action incorporating different 
timeframes, a variety of cueing mechanisms, and both positive and negative prompts. 
Recent IS research has proposed higher order constructs such as perceived threat and security related 
attitude as mediators of behavior intentions (Anderson et al. 2010; Liang et al. 2010). While beneficial, 
these approaches may obscure the unique influences of the primary antecedents of behavioral intentions. 
PAM adopts the approach most common in health behavior research to model the influence of key 
antecedents as direct relationships to behavioral intentions.  
Direct modeling of the antecedents to intentions in PAM is also important for evaluating the potential for 
moderations influencing assessments of severity and susceptibility drawn from HBM and PMT. Liang and 
Xue (2010) demonstrated a counter-intuitive negative moderation of threat and response efficacy on 
intentions. We have confirmed this finding and further clarified that both perceived susceptibility and 
perceived severity are negatively moderated by perceptions that security issues are avoidable. In essence, 
perceived susceptibility and avoidability are separate and distinct influences on intentions. Individuals 
may see that certain threats are avoidable, either by adopting specific preventive behaviors or by finding 
alternative methods to achieve the desired computer functions.  
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Conclusions 
This study sought to develop a model to examine organizational users’ preventive adoption of information 
security behaviors, based on similar models in the health behavior literature. The resulting model was 
derived by integrating concepts from the health belief model, protection motivation theory, and theory of 
planned behavior, along with other constructs specific to the information systems and information 
security contexts. The results of the study provide strong support for the Preventive Adoption Model with 
high explained variance in preventive security intentions. The results also show that users’ beliefs 
regarding the threat and its avoidability, the outcome of the prescribed preventive behaviors, and the 
compatibility between these behaviors and the users’ work roles and responsibilities are key factors in 
determining users’ intentions to practice information security behaviors. 
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